Abstract-User authentication based on username and password is the most common means to enforce access control. This form of access restriction is prone to hacking since stolen usernames and passwords can be exploited to impersonate legitimate users in order to commit malicious activity. Biometric authentication incorporates additional user characteristics such as the manner by which the keyboard is used in order to identify users. We introduce a novel approach for user authentication based on the keystroke dynamics of the password entry. A classifier is tailored to each user and the novelty lies in the manner by which the training set is constructed. Specifically, only the keystroke dynamics of a small subset of users, which we refer to as representatives, is used along with the password entry keystroke dynamics of the examined user. The contribution of this approach is twofold: it reduces the possibility of overfitting, while allowing scalability to a high volume of users. We propose two strategies to construct the subset for each user. The first selects the users whose keystroke profiles govern the profiles of all the users, while the second strategy chooses the users whose profiles are the most similar to the profile of the user for whom the classifier is constructed. Results are promising reaching in some cases 90% area under the curve. In many cases, a higher number of representatives deteriorate the accuracy which may imply overfitting. An extensive evaluation was performed using a dataset containing over 780 users.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
DENTITY theft is a fraud in which criminals impersonate legitimate users by stealing their credentials, such as credit card details and passwords, or by exploiting a logged-on computer which was left unlocked by the user. Stolen identities may be used to perform a wide range of malicious activities such as online purchases that are performed under stolen identities. Such purchases incur losses of billions of dollars to the websites as well as to their insurance companies [9] .
Currently, the most common way to enforce access control is by password, personal identification number (PIN), or other predetermined passcode [3] , [5] . The user is required to enter her credentials before she is allowed to perform her intended activity. This form of access control, although effective to a certain extent, has many flaws which make it vulnerable to hacking [16] . In order to make a password hard to hack, it must adhere certain rules, e.g., include at least eight characters, some of which capital letters and special characters (e.g., @, ?, !). Unfortunately, hard-to-hack passwords are also hard-to-remember. Consequently, many users choose passwords that relate to their private lives, e.g., digits from their social security number, pet's name, parent's or kids' names-making them easy to hack. Furthermore, many users write their passwords on a note which may be intercepted by hackers. This so-called memory obstacle also drives most users to use the same username and password in several web sites. Thus, a hacker revealing a users' password from a nonsecure website will gain access to many of the websites that the user has access to-hacking into some of which, such as the user's bank website, may incur devastating damage to the user. Due to these drawbacks, password-based user authentication methods provide only partial protection against hackers and, thus, they need to be complemented by additional authentication means, e.g., physiological and behavioral biometrics.
Behavioral biometrics, such as keystroke dynamics, can be used to identify the user either during log-in or throughout the time the user is logged-on (the latter is referred to as continuous verification and is out of the scope of this paper). Authentication methods that employ this approach rely on the assumption that the keystroke dynamics of each user stay almost the same in each login attempt while uniquely characterizing each user [14] . Commonly, the keystroke dynamics of the user are extracted during login and compared with a model that was constructed based on the user's keystroke dynamics and/or similar features of other users.
Physiological biometrics include fingerprints [9] , iris patterns [17] , retina patterns [9] , body heat [9] , keyboard typing pressure [7] , palm lines [20] , and haptic measurements [3] , to name a few. Physical biometrics have many advantages, e.g., they are harder to steal (although an imposter can still forge a fingerprint [12] ) and cannot be lost or forgotten since users do not need to remember them or write them down as opposed to a password or a PIN. However, authentication systems that use these features require special hardware, making them more expensive and time consuming to develop than methods that rely on existing hardware devices (e.g., mouse and keyboard). Moreover, the accuracy of biometric-based systems may be affected by various factors: If a fingerprint is changed by a cut, a burn, or its moisture level, the system may fail to identify that person; the retina may be influenced by health problems, such as glaucoma and high blood pressure, which are known to change the retina in subjects [9] . Additionally, when physical biometrics, such as fingerprints, are stolen, not only can they be used to falsely incriminate the innocent but also the legitimate owner cannot change them to prevent future impersonation attempts, whereas a compromised password can simply be replaced to prevent such attempts. Finally, acquisition of the biometric features may annoy the user since it requires interaction with special hardware.
Contrary to physiological biometrics, the acquisition of behavioral features is nonintrusive and may be transparent to the user. For example, in case keystroke dynamics are used, a background process is used to collect them from the user's keyboard usage. This may make the authentication process smoother and more user-friendly. Note that behavioral biometrics authentication systems need to store the biometric features in addition to the password. Accordingly, encryption is required to protect them similarly to passwords since the biometric features of passwords entry may be exploited to narrow down an exhaustive search of passwords. We assume that such measures are taken.
In this paper, we propose a new approach to user authentication according to the keystroke dynamics of the password entry. In the proposed system, every user is characterized by a biometric profile, which is constructed in the following way: The users are required to type their password for a given number of times. Features are extracted from the keystroke dynamics of every password entry and are represented as a vector-one for each password entry. The feature vectors that are extracted from the password entries of a given user form her biometric profile. The biometric profiles of all users are stored in a profile database.
The authentication of a user is accomplished using a classifier that is tailored to each user. The novelty of the proposed approach is in the manner by which the training sets are constructed for the examined users. Specifically, a small subset of representative users is selected for each examined user. Various strategies may be employed for the selection process and the subset content depends on the examined user as well as the chosen strategy. The training set is composed of the biometric profiles of the representative users and the user for whom the model is built. The underlying assumption is that different levels of similarities can be found among the biometric profiles of all users. Accordingly, it may be sufficient to identify a user by distinguishing her password keystroke dynamics from the profiles of only a subset of users rather than the profiles of all the users. Ideally, when the selected subset represents the entire spectrum of users, the biometric profile of a hacker will resemble a representative profile which is different from the one of the user that he is trying to impersonate and, thus, will be classified as an imposter.
By using a subset of users instead of the entire set, we aim to achieve two goals: first, prevent overfitting, and second, facilitate scalability to handle a large number of users. The experimental evaluation shows that the first goal is achieved by the proposed method since in most cases, choosing a higher number of representatives reduces the authentication accuracy. According to [16] , the goal has not been addressed although being a key feature of biometric authentication systems. In the proposed approach, even though only a small subset of users is used to build the authentication model, the model may still be used to authenticate the user among a high volume of users. Specifically, in our experiments, the largest number of representatives that was used to construct a model was less than 7% of the total number of 783 users and in many cases, the model that achieved the best results contained less than 5% of the total number of users. Note that the entire set of the users is only needed during the selection of the representatives. After the selection, the entire set is no longer needed and the construction and authentication rely only on the representatives.
We propose two strategies to choose the representatives. Both employ clustering to the keyboard dynamic features of all the users in order to detect interprofile similarities. Each cluster contains a subset of feature vectors that are similar to one another. Thus, each cluster represents a unique keystroke behavior that may be used to characterize a number of users in the dataset (provided the number of clusters is smaller than the number of users). Due to this similarity, a unique user profile may be used to represent each cluster instead of using all the feature vectors in the cluster. Employing this assumption, the first strategy chooses a unique user to represent each cluster. In order to do so, the centroids of the clusters are calculated as well as the centroids of every user's feature vectors. The centroid of a set of vectors is defined as their mean. Given a cluster, the user that is chosen to represent it is the one whose feature vectors' centroid is the closest to cluster's centroid. Theoretically, this process may result in a user representing more than one cluster. However, when this occurs, the user is assigned to only one of the clusters where different users are chosen so that every cluster is represented by a unique user. This is required in order to obtain a subset whose diversity is as high as possible and it is accomplished by applying the Hungarian matching algorithm [6] , which is described in details in Section III-A.
The second strategy chooses a different set of representatives. Let u be a user for whom a classifier is constructed. The users that are chosen as representatives are those whose profiles are similar to u's profile. This is achieved in the following manner: First, the centroid c(u) of u's feature vectors is calculated. Next, the cluster k whose centroid is the closest to c (u) is found. Then, the centroid of the feature vectors of each user is calculated. The users that are chosen as representatives are those whose feature vectors' centroids are the closest to the centroid of the cluster k (the cluster that is associated with the user u).
Given a user, half of her feature vectors together with half of the feature vectors of each of the representatives are used to train the user's classifier. The remaining halves together with the feature vectors of the rest of the nonrepresentatives users are used as the test set where the remaining half of the user is used to check whether the classifier identifies her and the rest simulates imposters. Unfortunately, an organization is vulnerable to attacks that come from both users that belong to the organization (internal) and users that are external to it. In this sense, we regard the representatives as internal users and use half of their feature vectors for the training set, while the rest of the users simulate users that are external to the organization. Note that due to the low number of representatives, the vast majority of test users are part in the training, and therefore, this construction simulates an open world setting where most imposters are external to the organization. Fig. 1 depicts how these components are used during enrollment of a user.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we describe the general framework and various aspects of user authentication systems that use behavioral biometrics. In Section III, we give a formal description of the proposed approach. Experimental settings and results are provided in Section IV. We conclude in Section V with a description of the various challenges and open problems that need further investigation in order to make this approach fully operational.
II. BEHAVIORAL BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM
Behavioral biometric authentication systems (BBASs) provide a cheap and effective security approach that complements password-based authentication methods. Most BBASs use keyboard or mouse behavioral characteristics. In this paper, we focus on keyboard behavioral characteristics. Combining regular password authentication with biometric authentication can provide a security suite that may be more water proof than systems that only rely on passwords. Namely, even if a password is stolen by a hacker, the password needs to be typed in the same manner it is typed by its rightful owner.
The evaluation of such BBASs commonly uses a predefined phrase simulating a password (see, e.g., [10] and [11] ). This phrase is entered by the users that take part in the evaluation and the extracted features are used for the construction of the authentication model. In Section II-A we describe current stateof-the-art BBASs. Keyboard-based BBAS's, or KBBAS's for short, have many advantages and receive an increasing amount of attention for the following reasons: 1) they do not require special hardware; 2) their operation does not require special attention from the user as opposed to retina scan, for example, in which the user is required to place her head in a retina scanner; 3) their development is easier compared with other biometric authentication methods; and 4) keyboard ubiquity makes the data collection process cheap and accessible. Nonetheless, a reliable and effective KBBAS needs to overcome the following obstacles: 1) keyboard-based biometrics are yet not reliable as physical biometrics such as the iris, fingerprint, etc; 2) keyboard behavioral characteristics may change after a period of time due to fatigue and may also be influenced by the physical status of the user and his state of mind; 3) the keyboard that is used to characterize the user plays an important role since users may type differently on different types of keyboards (laptop, desktop, ergonomic/nonergonomic keyboards); Generally, biometric-based user authentication systems consist of the following modules:
1) event recording module-captures events generated by user interaction with the input devices, e.g., keyboard and mouse; 2) feature Extraction module-extracts features from the captured events such as the time each key was pressed and organizes them in a vector; 3) classifier-during the construction, the classifier is trained according to the feature vectors. During identification, the constructed classifier is used to confirm the identity of the user according to feature vectors extracted from her keystrokes. A wide variety of classifiers may be chosen, e.g., decision trees [2] , artificial neural networks and support vector machines [19] to name a few; 4) database-contains the behavioral characteristics of the users together with the classifiers.
A. Keyboard-Based Dynamics
Keystroke dynamics can be described by several features which are extracted from the typing rhythm of the user. These features are extracted from data which are recorded by the event recording module. Usually, each keystroke is represented by two timestamps: the moment that the key was pressed and the moment that it was released. Dwell time refers to a single keystroke and it is defined as the time that passed between the moment the key was pressed and the moment that it was released [see Fig. 2(a) ]. Given two consecutive keystrokes, the following features can be defined: 1) latency time measures the time between the moment the first key was released and the second key was pressed [see 3) up to up time measures the time between the moment the first key was released and the moment the second key was released [see Fig. 2(d) ]. The latency time is also referred to as the digraph latency time as well as the interval time in some papers [15] . It is not necessary to use all of these features. In fact, in this paper, as in many other papers, we only use the latency and dwell times since the other features can be derived from them.
KBBASs can be distinguished according to the training data that they use: static (Fixed) or nonstatic (free) text where the proposed method in this paper falls into the former category. Techniques that use static data characterize the user keyboard behavior based on features which are extracted from predetermined text that the users are required to enter. Methods that use nonstatic text extract the keyboard behavior from any text content that is entered by the user where no limitations are imposed on the text and are out of the scope of this paper. Most methods extract the aforementioned features from sequences of two, three, or any number of characters which are commonly known as digraphs, trigraphs, and n-graphs, respectively.
In order to evaluate the performance of an authentication method, the following performance metrics are used: 1) True positive rate (TPR)-the ratio between the number of legitimate interactions that were correctly labeled and the total number of legitimate interactions; 2) False acceptance rate (FAR)-the ratio between the number of attacks that were erroneously labeled as legitimate interactions and the total number of attacks; 3) False rejection rate (FRR)-the ratio between the number of legitimate interactions that were misclassified as attacks and the total number of legitimate interactions; 4) Area under the curve (AUC)-measures the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC) curve. An ROC curve is a graphical representation of the tradeoff between the TPR (y-axis) and the FAR (x-axis) given a classifier which produces a probability for each predicted label. A high AUC is sought after since it corresponds to a better performance. In this paper, the AUC is used to measure the accuracy of the proposed methods; 5) Equal error rate (EER)-The rate at which both the false acceptance and the false rejection rates are equal when plotting the FAR versus the FRR in a similar manner to the construction of the ROC curve. A curve that is related to the ROC curve plots the FAR versus the FRR. This curve is useful for the evaluation of authentication systems since FAR corresponds to malicious users who are logged into the system, while FRR corresponds to legitimate users being blocked from accessing the system which may antagonize the users. We aim to minimize both however, usually the FRR increases with the decrease in the FAR, and thus, ERR describes the point both achieve the best measure with respect to one another.
In the following, we describe currently available keyboardbased authentication techniques which are based on static text that is used for the username and password.
Yong et al. [21] use parallel decision trees (DTs) to authenticate users according to a fixed phrase containing 37 characters.
A Monte Carlo approach is used to attain sufficient training data resulting in eight training subsets that are used to construct eight DTs for each user. The user is authenticated if at least three DTs do so; otherwise, the user is rejected. The average FRR was 9.62% and the average FAR was 0.88%.
Bleha et al. [1] authenticate users according to two different types of passwords: names and a fixed phrase. Latencies were used to represent each password entry and the nearest neighbor and Bayesian classifiers were both used to authenticate a user. A password entry was rejected only if both classifiers rejected the user (the indecision error, i.e., when one classifier accepted the user, while the other rejected her, was 1.2%). In both classifiers, thresholds were used and their values were lowered if the user was rejected in the first attempt. In order to evaluate their approach, ten users were used as legitimate users and 22 as imposters. They achieved FRR of 3.1% and FAR of 0.5%.
Monrose et al. [13] propose a user authentication scheme using a hardened password-a combination of the textual password along with its keystroke entry dynamics. The method required hackers to perform a more extensive exhaustive search to discover a password even if they got hold of the password file. The hardened password could also be used to encrypt the user's files. The method adjusts to changes in the user's keystroke dynamics by replacing older dynamics with new ones. The experimental evaluation used an eight character password, 20 users, and a total of 481 logins in which the correct password was entered. However, since the evaluation was based on a password guessing procedure, which is unique to their paper, we do not include its results.
Hosseinzadeh and Krishnan [8] use an up-to-up keystroke latency (UUKL) feature and compare its performance with the key hold-down time (KD) and down-to-down keystroke latency (DDKL) features using a Gaussian mixture model-based verification system that utilizes an adaptive and user-specific threshold based on the leave-one-out method (LOOM). Their results show that the UUKL feature significantly outperforms the KD and DDKL features. Furthermore, the inclusion of the UUKL feature achieved an EER of 4.4% based on a database of 41 users.
Revett et al. [18] describe an authentication algorithm based on rough sets. The users were asked to enter a 14 character passphrase composed of three words. They examined the digraphs of each passphrase and extracted: 1) the time between consecutives keystrokes; 2) time to enter each word in the passphrase; 3) total time to enter the passphrase; and 4) time spent to enter half of the passphrase. These attributes were discretized using an entropy/minimum descriptive length (MDL) algorithm and used to derive a set of authentication rules. The experimental evaluation included approximately 100 users which were split into two groups: legitimate (ten users) and imposters. Recently, Killourhy and Maxion [10] , [11] compared between 14 anomaly detection techniques for user authentication which included one-class support vector machine, fuzzy logic, neural networks (standard and autoassociative), nearest neighbor using various metrics, e.g., the Mahalanobis, the Euclidean, and the Manhattan distances. The evaluation used data that were collected from 51 users who entered a ten character predefined password 400 times in eight different sessions (the dataset is available online, [11] ). The model that achieved the best results (ERR = 9.62%) used the nearest-neighbor inducer with the scaled Manhattan distance.
III. PROPOSED ALGORITHM
be the set of N users from whom keystroke dynamics are collected. Every user is required to enter a predefined password for M times. The same password is entered by all users so that only the biometric authentication capabilities of the proposed approach are evaluated. Features are extracted from each password entry and a total of N · M feature vectors are formed. We denote this set by Σ = {s i,j } where s i,j ∈ R D is the feature vector of the jth password entry of user i, D is the number of features that are collected and i = 1, . . . N; j = 1, . . . , M.
We denote by R (u) ⊂ U the set of representative users that are chosen for the construction of user u's classifier. In order to choose R (u), we first partition Σ into K clusters where K is given as a parameter to the algorithm and K−1 is the number of representatives we look for (we always include u in the set of representatives as mentioned in Section I). We assume that two close feature vectors (according to the Euclidean distance) indicate similarity between the keyboard dynamics of their corresponding passwords entry. We denote by C = {c i } K i=1 the centroids of the obtained clusters.
Two strategies to select R (u) are proposed. The first method chooses a unique user representative from each cluster. We refer to this approach as the cluster representative (CR) approach. The second approach selects the users whose biometric profiles are the most similar to that of the examined user. We refer to this approach as the inner-cluster nearest-neighbor approach (ICR).
A. Choosing R(u) as Cluster Representatives
We calculate the centroids of the feature vectors of each user. The representative of the ith cluster, which is denoted by r i , is chosen as the user whose feature vectors' centriod is the closest to c i , i.e.,
The set of u's representatives is given by
. Choosing R (u) in this manner may result in users that are selected more than once (from a number of clusters). In this case, the number of representatives that are chosen is smaller than K which in turn may damage the diversity and the accuracy of the constructed classifier. In order to remove user repetitions, we apply the Hungarian matching algorithm [6] to the set of users and clusters. This algorithm matches each cluster with a unique user.
The general matching problem takes a bipartite graph 
In our settings, we set V 1 to U where each vertex v i corresponds to the user u i . We set V 2 to be the set of clusters that are represented by their centroids. The weight of an edge between a vertex (user) u i ∈ V 1 and a vertex (centroid) c k ∈ V 2 is set to be the distance between c k and the centroid of u i 's feature vectors.
A precondition of the original matching problem is that |V 1 | = |V 2 |. Since the number of clusters is substantially smaller than the number of users, we add to V 2 a set of |U | − K dummy vertices which we denote by Δ = {δ p } p=1,...,|U |−k such that V 2 = C ∪ Δ. We set an infinite weight to the edges between the users in V 1 and the dummy vertices, i.e., w (u i , δ p ) = +∞, where p = 1,. . ., |U |−K. Due to (1) and the infinite weight of the edges connecting the vertices in V 1 to the dummy vertices, each user will be matched to a nondummy vertex. We denote by u i k the user that is matched to cluster c k . Fig. 3 illustrates the construction of the bipartite graph and an example of a matching result.
Recall that half of u's feature vectors together with half of the feature vectors of the representative users form the training set of u's classifier. Accordingly, u must be included in R (u). In case R (u) does not include u, we add it to R (u)replacing the representative whose cluster centroid is the closest to the centroid of the feature vectors of u (in Section IV, we examine whether maintaining the original representative affects the authentication accuracy).
B. Inner-Cluster Nearest-Neighbor Approach to Choose R (u) (ICR)
In contrast with the CR approach, in this approach, R (u) contains u and the users whose biometric profiles are the most similar to u's biometric profile. First, we find the cluster k(u) whose centroid c k (u ) is the closest to the centroid of u's feature vectors, i.e.,
Next, we find the K − 1 users whose feature vectors' centroids are the closest to c k (u ) . Thus, R (u) consists of u and the K − 1 users v 1 , . . . , v K −1 who achieve the lowest values of 
C. Random Selection of Representatives
A third method constructs R (u) from u and K−1 randomly selected users which differ from u. We refer to this method as the random representative selection method and it is used for comparison with the CR and ICR methods.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
One of the major obstacles in the development of user authentication methods is obtaining data for performance evaluation. To date, no benchmark dataset consisting of hundreds of users is available. One of the known benchmark datasets which is available online was constructed by Killourhy and Maxion [10] , [11] . This dataset consists of 51 users who entered the phrase '.tie5Roanl' 400 times in eight different sessions. However, this dataset does not meet our requirements since we needed a larger number of users to choose representatives from. Furthermore, we put emphasis on a small number of samples for each user to reduce the data collection burden on the users. Thus, we constructed a dataset, whose size is an order of a magnitude larger than most datasets that are used by current state-of-the-art methods.
The dataset was constructed in the following manner: 817 users were asked to enter the phrase 'password' ten times. The same keyboard was used for all password entries and the sampling resolution was in milliseconds. A feature vector describing the keystroke dynamics of each passphrase entry was constructed. The vector consisted of two parts: 1) the dwell times of the characters; and 2) the latencies between each pair of consecutive characters; the "enter" key that was pressed at the end was also considered part of the phrase. The structure of the feature vector is illustrated in Fig. 4 . Phrases whose entry included corrections (up to 3) were also included in the dataset (provided the final phrase was correct). We allowed corrections since they are quite common in password entry; however, we limited the number of corrections to three in order to avoid the contamination of the dataset with entries that were probably the result of either lack of concentration or interest on behalf of certain users. For example, if a user typed "passq," pressed the backspace to erase the "q" and, then, typed "word," this keystroke sequence was included in the dataset.
In order to construct the feature vectors, all the keys that were pressed by all the users were found including characters that were a result of a typo. The first part of the feature vector included an entry for the dwell time of each of the found characters. If a character was not pressed in a given phrase entry, its corresponding dwell time entry was set to zero. Next, all pairs of consecutive keys that were pressed were found-again, including typos. The second part of the feature vector included an entry for the latency of each pair of this kind. If a pair did not occur in the phrase entry, its corresponding latency was set to zero. If a character or a consecutive pair of characters occurred more than once in a given phrase entry, their corresponding dwell and latency in the feature vector were set to the average of their occurrence. Initially, the length of each feature vector was 169 (dwell times and latencies) indicating various typos throughout the dataset. However, if "password" was entered without typos, only nine dwell entries and eight latencies were nonzero. Consequently, we had to clean the dataset from abnormal entries. Specifically, we excluded users and their features vectors if one of their feature vectors included: 1) features that were nonzero in very few vectors; and 2) entry time longer than 5 s. The filtered dataset contained 783 users-each having ten feature vectors where each vector was composed of at most 23 nonzero features (when there were no corrections, the size of the feature vector was 23 where six features contained zero).
All experiments were performed using the WEKA [4] software package. The feature vectors of every user were divided into two disjoint sets of five feature vectors each. The methods were evaluated for ten users that were randomly selected. The training set of each evaluated user was composed of five of her feature vectors and five feature vectors of each of her representatives. The test set was composed of: 1) the five remaining feature vectors of the user; 2) the remaining five feature vectors of each of the representatives; and 3) the ten feature vectors of each of the nonrepresentative users.
Three inducers were used where the emphasis was put on their simplicity: Naïve Bayes, nearest neighbor (WEKA's IBK with K = 1), and the AdaBoost ensemble using the C4.5 DT (J48 in WEKA) as the ensemble core inducer. We used the k-means algorithm to cluster the data. Various numbers of representatives were tested. For each randomly chosen user u, an inducer I, and a number of clusters K, a classifier was constructed based on the training vectors of the users in R(u).
The accuracy of the proposed methods was evaluated according to the AUC criterion. In the following, we evaluate various aspects of the proposed approach.
A. Experiment 1: Influence of the Number of Clusters/ Representatives on the Accuracy
The underlying assumption of the proposed algorithms is that the keystroke dynamics of all the users can be characterized by the profiles of a small number of users (representatives) due to similarities in the keystroke behavior of the users. In order to examine this assumption, authentication models based on the CR, ICR, and random methods for representative selection were constructed using various numbers of clusters for each of the ten tested users. The AdaBoost-C4.5 inducer was used for all models. Fig. 5 shows that the number of clusters has statistically significant influence on the accuracy of the random representative selection method (F (22, 720) = 5.3588, p < 1%). However, increasing the number of clusters mostly deteriorates the accuracy which may be accounted to either overfitting or local AUC maxima. It can be seen that for the CR method, the same level of accuracy is obtained for 15 and 50 representatives indicating that increasing the number of representatives is not needed to obtain a certain level of accuracy. The same phenomenon can be observed in the ICR method where the best performance is obtained for 20 representatives.
B. Experiment 2: Influence of the Number of Clusters/ Representatives on the Inducer
We also examined the impact that the number of clusters has on the inducers that were used. The CR representative selection method was used to construct the authentication models based on the nearest neighbor (IB1), the Naïve Bayes, and the AdaBoost-C4.5 inducers. It can be seen in Fig. 6 that 1 ) the nearest-neighbor classifier (IBK) exhibits statistically significant inferiority to the other inducers; 2) the number of clusters has higher influence (manifested as bigger fluctuations) on the AdaBoost inducer than the other inducers; and 3) the AdaBoost accuracy increases with the number of clusters (substantial increase in the AUC was achieved when the number of clusters grew from 5 to 8 and from 23 to 40). Fig. 7 provides a closer look on the results obtained by the AdaBoost-C4.5 inducer. The effect that the number of clusters has on the authentication accuracy of the CR method for one of the test users is shown in Fig. 8 . The EER values are marked with circles and it can be seen that the best results are obtained for 50 clusters. The EER values for all the test users are summarized in Table I . It can be seen that for six out of the ten users, the accuracy reduces when the number of representatives is increased indicating that choosing a higher number of representatives may result in overfitting. The variation in EER values may be attributed to inconsistencies in the profiles of the chosen users.
C. Experiment 3: Exclusion of the Examined User's Cluster Representative
As described in Section III-A, when constructing R(u) using the CR approach, u 's CR r k (u ) is replaced by u. We examined whether adding u to R(u) without removing r k (u ) affects the accuracy of the classifier. When r k (u ) is not removed, the size of R(u) is K + 1. Fig. 9 shows that removing r k (u ) improves the results without statistical significance.
The EER values are circled. 
D. Experiment 4: Influence of the Human Factor on the Accuracy
The different manners by which users interact with the keyboard are utilized by BBASs to confirm their identity. On that note, we examined whether the authentication accuracy is influenced by the human factor, i.e., by the typing manner of the test users. Fig. 10 illustrates the authentication accuracy in term of the AUC criterion for the ten examined users. It can be seen that the human factor is statistically significant. Namely, the proposed method produces very accurate results for some users (such as in the case of the username u4 which obtained AUC of 95%), while producing less accurate results for others, e.g., the AUC of user u1 is only 67%. This may be accounted for the different consistency levels in the typing manner of the users.
E. Experiment 5: Accuracy Comparison Between Internal and External Attacks
Commonly, a distinction is made between users that belong to the organization (internal) and users that are external to the organization. Recall that (Section I) the CRs are considered as the internal users, while the remaining users constitute the external ones. In this experiment, we evaluated the accuracy of the proposed approach when applied to only external users. We compared the results with those obtained for only the internal users. In order to do so, two test sets were used. The first consisted of only the test feature vectors of the representative users, while the second was composed of only the feature vectors of the nonrepresentative users. The classifiers were constructed using the CR method and the AdaBoost-C4.5 inducer and the results are shown in Fig. 11 . It can be seen that the authentication is only slightly less accurate when only applied to external users where the differences are statistically insignificant. This shows that the proposed method is equally effective for both external and internal attacks. Fig. 12 compares the overall performance of the different representative selection methods when the AdaBoost-C4.5 inducer is used. Both the CR and ICR methods produce results that are significantly better than randomly selection of the representatives where CR is slightly better than ICR. In Fig. 13 , the results for one of the test users is displayed when 30 representatives are selected. In this case, the CR method is better than both the ICR and the random methods. Table II summarizes the average AUC results for 1) the inducers; 2) the representative selection methods; 3) the number of clusters; and 4) the test groups. The results indicate that the CR method is better than the other two methods when using the Naïve Bayes and AdaBoost-C4.5 inducers. Furthermore, in nine out of the 18 cases, the best accuracy is not achieved by the highest number of representatives which may be attributed to overfitting due to a high number of representatives.
F. Experiment 6: Comparison Between the Representative Selection Methods
We conclude this section with Table III comparing the CR method (using AdaBoost) with currently available state-of-theart methods. These results were evaluated for the inspected users.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a novel approach for authentication of users at login according to the biometric characteristics of the password entry. A classifier is tailored to each user where the novelty lays in the way the training sets are constructed for each tested user. Namely, only the feature vectors of a small subset of the users constitutes the training set of each user.
Choosing a small training set reduces the possibility of overfitting while allowing scalability to a large volume of users. We introduced the CR and ICR strategies to select the representatives. The CR strategy chooses the users whose biometric profiles govern the biometric profiles of all the users, while the ICR strategy chooses the users whose biometric profiles are the most similar to the biometric profile of the examined user. Both methods employ clustering to the session data in order to find interuser profile similarities. Both methods are superior to a simple random selection of representatives.
The results obtained in this paper show that constructing the training set using only a small set of representative users is promising. Other selection methods should be sought after and other inducers should be examined in order to further improve the results. Where possible, rigorous justification should be provided in order to theoretically corroborate the proposed methods. Additionally, choosing the number of representatives that produces the best results is still an open problem which is currently being investigated by the authors.
A common problem in user authentication is the acquisition of data for the evaluation of the proposed methods. Since the proposed approach selects representative users, a dataset with a large enough number of users was required. Unfortunately, no benchmark dataset that met our requirements was available and we had to construct our own dataset containing over 800 users. The absence of benchmark datasets makes it difficult to compare between methods since each method may have different requirements.
Furthermore, many authentication systems, e.g., in commercial websites, handle a large number (10 3 -10 6 ) of users [16] . In the approach proposed in this paper, only a small subset of users is used to build the authentication model, while the model may be used to authenticate a user among a much higher number of users. In our experiments, the largest number of representatives that was used to construct a model was less than 7% of the total number of users and, in many cases, the model that achieved the best results contained less than 5% of the total number of users. These results indicate the ability to scale to a high volume of users. In order to corroborate this, the proposed method should be evaluated using a dataset containing 10 3 -10 6 users. However, collecting keystroke dynamics from such a large number of users is a difficult task [16] . It should be noted that the proposed approach was tested using a single computer. Another challenge is to adapt it to handle multiple keyboards and remote connections where delays due to the remote connections are one of the main issues that need to be addressed.
Finally, the authors are currently investigating ways to update the classification models given new collected data-an approach which was employed by Monrose et al. [13] .
